Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Plutarch, Augustine and Daniel C. Dennett

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120 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
An overexamined life is as bad as an unexamined one [Dennett]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Rationality requires the assumption that things are either for better or worse [Dennett]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
I prefer a lack of form to mean non-existence, than to think of some quasi-existence [Augustine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
Three main questions seem to be whether a thing is, what it is, and what sort it is [Augustine]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
We can bring dispositions into existence, as in creating an identifier [Dennett, by Mumford]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
Words are fixed by being attached to similarity clusters, without mention of 'essences' [Dennett]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
Replacing timbers on Theseus' ship was the classic illustration of the problem of growth and change [Plutarch]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Philosophers regularly confuse failures of imagination with insights into necessity [Dennett]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
Why pronounce impossible what you cannot imagine? [Dennett]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
I must exist in order to be mistaken, so that even if I am mistaken, I can't be wrong about my own existence [Augustine]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
The sun is always bright; it doesn't become bright when it emerges [Plutarch]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Our images of bodies are not produced by the bodies, but by our own minds [Augustine, by Aquinas]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
Light wavelengths entering the eye are only indirectly related to object colours [Dennett]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Our minds grasp reality by direct illumination (rather than abstraction from experience) [Augustine, by Matthews]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
Memory contains innumerable principles of maths, as well as past sense experiences [Augustine]
Mind and memory are the same, as shown in 'bear it in mind' or 'it slipped from mind' [Augustine]
Why does joy in my mind make me happy, but joy in my memory doesn't? [Augustine]
We would avoid remembering sorrow or fear if that triggered the emotions afresh [Augustine]
I can distinguish different smells even when I am not experiencing them [Augustine]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
That every mammal has a mother is a secure reality, but without foundations [Dennett]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
Causal theories require the "right" sort of link (usually unspecified) [Dennett]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Brains are essentially anticipation machines [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
Minds are hard-wired, or trial-and-error, or experimental, or full self-aware [Dennett, by Heil]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
When the soul is intelligent and harmonious, it is part of god and derives from god [Plutarch]
Some philosophers say the soul is light [Plutarch]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism
Memory is so vast that I cannot recognise it as part of my mind [Augustine]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
We can't draw a clear line between conscious and unconscious [Dennett]
Perhaps the brain doesn't 'fill in' gaps in consciousness if no one is looking. [Dennett]
Sentience comes in grades from robotic to super-human; we only draw a line for moral reasons [Dennett]
Does consciousness need the concept of consciousness? [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness
Maybe language is crucial to consciousness [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
Conscious events can only be explained in terms of unconscious events [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 3. Privacy
We can know a lot of what it is like to be a bat, and nothing important is unknown [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Theories of intentionality presuppose rationality, so can't explain it [Dennett]
Unconscious intentionality is the foundation of the mind [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
Dennett denies the existence of qualia [Dennett, by Lowe]
What is it like to notice an uncomfortable position when you are asleep? [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties [Dennett]
"Qualia" can be replaced by complex dispositional brain states [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 6. Inverted Qualia
We can't assume that dispositions will remain normal when qualia have been inverted [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 7. Blindsight
In peripheral vision we see objects without their details, so blindsight is not that special [Dennett]
Blindsight subjects glean very paltry information [Dennett]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
I am the sum total of what I directly control [Dennett]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
People accept blurred boundaries in many things, but insist self is All or Nothing [Dennett]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
Being a person must involve having second-order beliefs and desires (about beliefs and desires) [Dennett]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / c. Self as brain controller
Rather than being the whole soul, maybe I am its chief part? [Plutarch]
The psychological self is an abstraction, not a thing in the brain [Dennett]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
Without memory I could not even speak of myself [Augustine]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
Selves are not soul-pearls, but artefacts of social processes [Dennett]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 3. Narrative Self
We tell stories about ourselves, to protect, control and define who we are [Dennett]
We spin narratives about ourselves, and the audience posits a centre of gravity for them [Dennett]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
The brain is controlled by shifting coalitions, guided by good purposeful habits [Dennett]
The work done by the 'homunculus in the theatre' must be spread amongst non-conscious agencies [Dennett]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Can we conceive of a being with a will freer than our own? [Dennett]
You can be free even though force would have prevented you doing otherwise [Dennett, by PG]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
Awareness of thought is a step beyond awareness of the world [Dennett]
Foreknowledge permits control [Dennett]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
If the future does not exist, how can prophets see it? [Augustine]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
The contact of spirit and body is utterly amazing, and incomprehensible [Augustine]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
If an epiphenomenon has no physical effects, it has to be undetectable [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
Dualism wallows in mystery, and to accept it is to give up [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 3. Intentional Stance
Beliefs and desires aren't real; they are prediction techniques [Dennett]
The active self is a fiction created because we are ignorant of our motivations [Dennett]
If mind is just an explanation, the explainer must have beliefs [Rey on Dennett]
The 'intentional stance' is a way of interpreting an entity by assuming it is rational and self-aware [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Could a robot be made conscious just by software? [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 6. Homuncular Functionalism
All functionalism is 'homuncular', of one grain size or another [Dennett]
We descend from robots, and our intentionality is composed of billions of crude intentional systems [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
There is no more anger in adrenaline than silliness in a bottle of whiskey [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
It is arbitrary to say which moment of brain processing is conscious [Dennett]
Visual experience is composed of neural activity, which we find pleasing [Dennett]
Maybe there is a minimum brain speed for supporting a mind [Dennett]
I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
If atoms have no qualities, they cannot possibly produce a mind [Plutarch]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
The materials for a mind only matter because of speed, and a need for transducers and effectors [Dennett]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / f. Emotion and reason
Some say emotion is a sort of reason, and others say virtue concerns emotion [Plutarch]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Like the 'centre of gravity', desires and beliefs are abstract concepts with no actual existence [Dennett]
You couldn't drive a car without folk psychology [Dennett]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
A language of thought doesn't explain content [Dennett]
The predecessor and rival of the language of thought hypothesis is the picture theory of ideas [Dennett]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
Memories are preserved separately, according to category [Augustine]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
What matters about neuro-science is the discovery of the functional role of the chemistry [Dennett]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
States have content if we can predict them well by assuming intentionality [Dennett, by Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 9. Conceptual Role Semantics
The nature of content is entirely based on its functional role [Dennett]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / b. Concepts are linguistic
Concepts are things we (unlike dogs) can think about, because we have language [Dennett]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / c. Concepts without language
Maybe there can be non-conscious concepts (e.g. in bees) [Dennett]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
Action needs an affinity for a presentation, and an impulse toward the affinity [Plutarch]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Augustine created the modern concept of the will [Augustine, by Matthews]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Being manly and brave is the result of convention, not of human nature [Plutarch]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love, and do what you will [Augustine]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Pagans produced three hundred definitions of the highest good [Augustine, by Grayling]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
Everyone wants happiness [Augustine]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
Animals don't value pleasure, as they cease sexual intercourse after impregnation [Plutarch]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The good life involves social participation, loyalty, temperance and honesty [Plutarch]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
Augustine said (unusually) that 'ought' does not imply 'can' [Augustine, by Matthews]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Learning is evolution in the brain [Dennett]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
Most people see an abortion differently if the foetus lacks a brain [Dennett]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 5. Sexual Morality
Animals have not been led into homosexuality, because they value pleasure very little [Plutarch]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
Originally there were no reasons, purposes or functions; since there were no interests, there were only causes [Dennett]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
If only atoms exist, how do qualities arise when the atoms come together? [Plutarch]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / c. Idealist time
To be aware of time it can only exist in the mind, as memory or anticipation [Augustine, by Bardon]
Maybe time is an extension of the mind [Augustine]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
How can ten days ahead be a short time, if it doesn't exist? [Augustine]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
If the past is no longer, and the future is not yet, how can they exist? [Augustine]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
The whole of the current year is not present, so how can it exist? [Augustine]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
I know what time is, until someone asks me to explain it [Augustine]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / h. Change in time
I disagree with the idea that time is nothing but cosmic movement [Augustine]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 3. The Beginning
Heaven and earth must be created, because they are subject to change [Augustine]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 1. Biology
Biology is a type of engineering, not a search for laws of nature [Dennett]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
Maybe plants are very slow (and sentient) animals, overlooked because we are faster? [Dennett]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Darwin's idea was the best idea ever [Dennett]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 5. God and Time
All things are in the present time to God [Augustine]
If God is outside time in eternity, can He hear prayers? [Augustine]
If God existed before creation, why would a perfect being desire to change things? [Augustine, by Bardon]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / e. Miracles
People report seeing through rocks, or over the horizon, or impossibly small works [Plutarch]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Absurd superstitions make people atheist, not disharmony in nature [Plutarch]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / d. Heresy
Augustine identified Donatism, Pelagianism and Manicheism as the main heresies [Augustine, by Matthews]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
No one will ever find a city that lacks religious practices [Plutarch]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / b. Human Evil
Augustine said evil does not really exist, and evil is a limitation in goodness [Augustine, by Perkins]